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ABSTRACT
Most research on visual object identification focus on the bottom-up processes of the
visual what? and where? pathways. However, such research has not been able to fully account
for many visual abilities (e.g., identifying an object among many other objects and across
changing conditions). Neurological evidence has shown that feedback from high-level areas (i.e.,
top-down processing) makes object processing more efficient. However, there are no behavioral
studies that have tested this. Thus, four experiments used a concurrent n-back task to occupy
higher-level areas and tested its effects on visual object processing relative to a numberrepetition control task.
Experiment 1 examined change detection in a flickering task, in which two versions of a
picture alternated rapidly with an intervening mask. Concurrent performance of the n-back task
reduced the ability to detect changes relative to the concurrent control task. Experiments 2, 3,
and 4 examined the identification of pictures that were presented briefly (50, 100, or 500 ms).
Overall, there were more errors and longer response times when a concurrent n-back task was
performed relative to the control task. With shorter presentation times, identification was less
accurate and more adversely affected by the n-back task. Experiment 3 examined short-term
priming of object identification in picture naming based on a briefly presented prime picture.
Short-term repetition priming effects were reliable but reduced when a concurrent n-back task
was performed, but priming was not affected by prime presentation time. Experiment 4
examined long-term priming of object identification based on a briefly presented prime picture.
Although the concurrent task effect indicated slower test-phase picture-naming responses for the
n-back condition, this result was inconclusive given that none of the priming effects were
statistically significant.
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The results suggest that top-down processes affect object processing in terms of attention,
which is essential to store and maintain information in working memory. It is also suggested that
attention plays an important role in facilitating the process of object recognition. In terms of
repetition priming, the present study confirmed the involvement of top-down processes in shortterm and long-term priming effects.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Most of the research on object recognition has focused on bottom-up processes. Bottomup signals along the visual “what” pathway go from occipital areas (e.g., V1, V2, V4) to the
temporal cortex (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982). However, bottom-up investigations have not
been able to fully account for several known phenomena in object recognition. That is, we have
not been able to understand completely the process by which humans are able to identify objects
among many distractors and across changing conditions or contexts.
Recently, neurological investigations have shown a strong influence of prefrontal cortex
(PFC) and parietal cortex (PC) on object recognition. Despite the evidence that PFC and PC
influence object recognition, it is not clear what is the nature of such influence. The dominant
explanation is that PFC and PC influence object recognition in terms of attention (e.g., Kastner &
Ungerleider, 2000). It has also been suggested that the influence of PFC (Bar, 2003) and PC
(e.g., Xu & Chun, 2006) is in terms of perception. There is even evidence that long-term
repetition priming of picture identification is reduced if areas from the PFC are disrupted by
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Wig, Grafton, Demos, & Kelley, 2005). These views
have only been explored using brain-imaging techniques, case studies of patients with prefrontal
damage, and neurological studies with animals. As far as we know, the function of top-down
processes in object recognition has not been explored using behavioral experiments with
humans.
Therefore, my dissertation goal was to test the function of top-down processes on object
processing by developing appropriate behavioral tasks and manipulations of stimuli and
instructions. Using behavioral procedures not only opens a range of possibilities to explore but it
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also reduces the time and the costs of testing. Four experiments were performed. Experiment 1
and 2 tested the influence of top-down processes on change detection and object recognition
respectively. Experiments 3 and 4 explored the function of top-down processes on short-term and
long-term picture repetition priming, which is facilitation based on previous experience with an
object.
1.1 Bottom-Up Accounts of Object Recognition
Neurological Support
There is substantial evidence accounting for object recognition from a bottom-up
perspective. This evidence suggests that areas responsible for object recognition are organized
hierarchically (e.g., Bullier, 2001). The object recognition or “what” pathway starts in V1
proceeds to V2, and then to V4 (Felleman & Van Essen 1991; Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982), to
end in the inferotemporal cortex (Ungerleider & Mishkin 1982). Cells in V1 and V2 have small
receptive fields with orientation selectivity (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; 1968). Some neurons in V2
are more active in the presence of complex stimuli such as curvatures and corners than to simpler
stimuli (e.g., lines) (Anzai, Peg, & Van Essen, 2007). Area V4 also shows selectivity for angles
and curvatures, and variation in response mainly depends on changes in orientations of angles
and curves (Gallant, Connor, Rakshit, Lewing, & Van Essen, 1996; Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994;
Pasupathy & Connor, 1999). Also V4 tends to respond more to convex features in contrast with
concave features (Pasupathy & Connor, 1999). The elements processed by V4 are considered to
have a medium level of complexity (Bar, 2003).
The information from V4 is sent to the anterior region of inferior temporal cortex. There,
it is processed and sent to other cortical areas such as the perirhinal cortex, the prefrontal cortex,
the amygdala, and the striatum (Tanaka, 1993). Tanaka (1993) was able to show that the
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organization in the anterior region of inferior temporal cortex is modular, resembling the
organization of V1. Such organization produces less susceptibility to changes in the environment
and an accurate representation. Also, he showed that cells in the anterior region of inferior
temporal cortex were sensitive to complex stimuli. That is, the stimuli needed to be more
complex than the ones that are able to activate neurons in V1 (e.g., more complex than
orientation, size, color and simple structure). There is also evidence that the inferotemporal
cortex has neurons sensitive to face patterns (Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982).
Two Bottom-Up Models of Object Recognition
Recognition by Components Model. According to Biederman, the transformation of each
perceived object into a ‘view-point invariant’ structure reduces its variability and facilitates
object identification (1987). The process of forming these structures begins with a simple sketch
of a perceived object. Following that, the perceptual system detects the ‘non-accidental
properties’ of such object (i.e., whether the contours are straight or curved, and whether they are
parallel in relation to other contours), and then matches these properties with a corresponding
‘geon’. Thus, a general structure of the object is formed and compared against memory
representations of different objects.
There is some neurological evidence suggesting that this is the case (Biederman, 2007).
For example, the evidence that inferior temporal cortex shows a preference for invariant complex
features (Tanaka, 1993) suggests that it is detecting geons. Also, inferior temporal cortex cells in
macaques showed more modulated firing when there was a change in ‘non-accidental properties’
(which are diagnostic in identifying geons), than when there was a change in ‘metric properties’
(i.e., relative characteristics of objects not diagnostic of geon identification) (Kayaert,
Biederman, & Vogels, 2003). A different experiment showed that neurons within inferior
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temporal cortex tended to respond to specific parts of an object (Tsunoda, Yamane, Nishizaki, &
Tanifuji, 2001). Recall that in Biederman’s theory, these parts are represented by geons. In
general, these findings suggest that there is some neurological evidence supporting the idea that
geons are automatically used in object recognition.
Biederman (2007) suggests that inferior temporal cortex is not only tuned to detect
complex stimuli but it also automatically detects ‘structural descriptions’, which are the specific
relations among the parts. In other words, the automatic detection of the object’s parts occurs in
parallel with detection of the different relations among them. He found that the intraparietal
sulcus is sensitive to the relations among parts of an object (Hayworth & Biederman, 2005),
consistent with the known role of the dorsal visual “where” pathway in processing the spatial
relations among distinct objects (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982).
Hummel (Hummel, 2001; Hummel & Biederman, 1992) developed a computational
model based on the recognition by components model. It consisted of a hierarchical network that
takes as input a line drawing of an object and produces as output the identity of the object. First,
the network detects the ‘nonaccidental properties’ of the object. From there, it detects the geons
conforming the object and the relationships among them (i.e., their structure). They also
incorporated synchronized oscillatory activity to solve the binding problem within the system.
That is, it solved the problem of how to encode the arrangement of the geons. The simulation of
the computational system consisted of a training and a test stage. During training, the system
was exposed to 10 different figures, and only one view of each object was presented. At test,
different versions of the figure presented at training were shown (i.e., they were moved to a new
position, the size was altered, they were rotated, or their mirror equivalent was presented). The
computational model was able to identify the changed figures with high accuracy. This supports
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the ability of the model to identify an object even when its irrelevant characteristics are changed.
One of the main limitations of this model is that it was only able to recognize very simple images
(e.g., few geometrical shapes forming one figure), and only when objects were presented in
isolation.
A Quantitative Model of Immediate Visual Recognition. Serre et al. (2007) have
developed a competing quantitative account of object recognition. According to them, object
recognition is a ‘tradeoff’ between selection and invariance. On one hand, the system needs to
detect relevant changes to recognize an object. On the other, the system needs to ignore
irrelevant features such as visual noise. In order to test this, they propose a computerized
hierarchical model (which goes from simple to complex) in which at each stage there are
selective and invariant mechanisms. They regard selective cells as simple (S) and invariant as
complex (C). In stage one, S1 cells detect simple changes, sending the information to C1 cells. C1
cells average all the input from S1 cells and send the information to S2 cells in the next stage of
the process, which in turn will send the info to C2, and so on.
There is neurological evidence that supports this view. For example, complex neurons are
present in V1 (e.g., Mahon & DeValois, 2001). This suggests that there are invariant cells even
in V1. Also, V2, V4, and inferior temporal cortex each have cells showing a range of selectivity
from relatively simple to relatively complex (e.g., Tanaka, 1996). The evidence mentioned
earlier that higher stages within the ventral visual pathway are sensitive to complex visual
patterns supports the hierarchical organization proposed. Serre’s computational model was able
to show scale and position invariance for new objects. Because of this invariance, having
experience with different views of the same object becomes unnecessary for recognition. Also,
Serre’s computational model was compared with human performance, in an animal vs. non-
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animal classification task and no significant differences were found between the model and
behavioral data. However, this was only true when humans were not able to use the aid of topdown processes (Serre et al., 2007).
Differences Between the Two Bottom-Up Models
One of the main discrepancies between the two models is that Serre et al. (2007) denies
the necessity of a segregation step for recognition, thus implying that geons are not necessary to
recognize objects. Recall that Biederman’s model has a segregation step where geons are a
critical step for object recognition. The second main discrepancy between the two models is that
Biederman assumes that structure is integrated with geon detection (2007). In contrast, for Serre
et al. (2007) the complex features detected by the ventral-visual pathway are ‘unbound features’,
which is consistent with cognitive theories of pre-attentive features (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).
In terms of attention, Hummel and Biederman (1994) suggested that attention is only necessary
to ignore attributes that do not belong to an object. While for others attention may be necessary
to unify the different attributes of an object (Tresiman & Gelade,1980; Wheeler & Treisman,
2002).
While a model like the one proposed by Biederman (1987) may not require the
intervention of top-down processes, Serre et al. (2007) affirm that their computerized model will
benefit from top-down processes. Following Bar (2003), I will argue that both models could
benefit from top-down processes. First, it still not clear how humans are able to recognize an
object so quickly, when they have a memory for a very large number of items. The problem is,
how can humans determine that an object is a known member of a known object category when
there are so many possibilities (memories of previous objects perceived) to compare it against.
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The other problem refers to the human ability to immediately recognize a target object
when there are many distracters (Serre et al., 2007). How are humans able to disregard irrelevant
objects to concentrate on the relevant ones? It seems that top-down processes would help to
solve such problems. For example, top-down processes may send relevant information to inferior
temporal cortex, reducing the possibilities of what the perceived object could be (see next section
for more information) (Bar, 2003). It is also possible that top-down processes functioning as
attention may direct bottom-up processes to concentrate on what is regarded as relevant, helping
to identify a target among distracters (Serre et al., 2007).
Based on these questions, the following sections will focus on object recognition from a
top-down perspective. Top-down influences can be defined either neurologically or
psychologically, and sometimes these two definitions do not agree (Frith, 2005). According to
Frith (2005), a top-down neurological perspective refers to the influence of feedback signals sent
from parts of the brain involved in high-level processing (e.g., PFC or PC) to parts of the brain
involved in lower level processing (e.g., low-level visual areas). In contrast, a psychological topdown perspective refers to specific experimental situations in which participants focus their
attention on some stimuli while ignoring others (bottom-up psychological situations are when
stimuli are passively perceived). A specific example in which these two definitions do not agree
is that, binding the different characteristics of an object requires feedback from the parietal
cortex (i.e., neurological top-down process), but there is no psychological control mechanism
that can stop such processes (i.e., a psychological top-down process) (Frith, 2005). Although the
individual cannot intentionally stop his or her own neurological top-down processes, it is
possible to use psychological tasks to disrupt such processes when both the top-down processes
and the psychological tasks require the same neurological resources. While the present study
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takes into account mainly a neurological top-down perspective, a psychological perspective is
also included, because the concurrent tasks required in the four experiments used psychological
top-down processes according to this definition, with the objective of disrupting the neurological
top-down processes.
1.2 Evidence for Top-Down Processing in Object Recognition
Neurological Support
Anatomical evidence supports the possibility that neural feedback influences object
recognition (e.g., Rempel-Clower & Barbas, 2000). Networks in frontal and parietal cortex seem
to be responsible for such top-down processes (e.g., Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). There is also
evidence that top-down signals have a faster effect on low-level visual areas (i.e., V1 and V2)
than the horizontal signals within the visual system that help to integrate lower level information
(e.g., Bullier, 2001). Also, visual attention via top-down processes can bias neural responses in
primary visual areas (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000) by increasing the responses of cells
responsible for capturing what is attended (e.g., Spitzer, Desimone, and Moran, 1988), filtering
out irrelevant information (e.g., Raynolds, Chelazzi, & Desimone, 1999), increasing baseline
activity before the to-be attended object is presented (e.g., Luck, Chelazzi, Hyllyard, &
Desimone, 1997), and enhancing visual contrast (see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). The
influence of top-down processes in visual processes is also supported by the fact that human
patients with prefrontal damage present difficulties in recognizing images when recognition is
made difficult, for example by occluding or scrambling the image (e.g., Richer & Boulet, 1999).
Moreover, electrophysiological studies support the conclusion that PFC is involved in object
categorization (e.g., Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 2001). All these studies suggest
that top-down processes are central in object recognition. However, there is still no agreement

8

whether the exact role of top-down processes in object recognition is in terms of attention or
perception.
Top-Down Attentional Involvement in Object Recognition
Kastner and Ungerleider (2000) claimed that top-down processes influence object
recognition in terms of attention only. The fact that top-down processes are active before
(Kastner & Ungeleider, 2000) or after (Supèr, 2005) the target object is presented supports this
claim, suggesting that top-down processes do not carry but regulate visual information in the
primary visual areas. Such processes are also involved in the maintenance of the attended
information for short time periods (Schmidt, Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2002). That is, topdown attentional processes actively participate in visual working memory.
The areas (i.e., prefrontal and parietal) associated with top-down attentional processes are
closely associated with working memory (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). Evidence from the
change blindness literature (Rensink, 2002) also supports this view by showing that visual
information has ‘limited spatial and temporal coherence’ prior to focused attention. According to
Rensink (2002) attention is not only necessary to bind visual information, but it needs to be
sustained to keep the binding intact. This suggests that without sustained attention there is no
visual working memory.
Top Down Perceptual Involvement in Object Recognition
Moshe Bar (2003) presented a model attempting to explain the role of PFC in object
recognition in terms of perceptual processes. Low frequency visual information is projected from
early visual areas to PFC (Rempel-Clower & Barbas, 2000), possibly by the magnocellular
pathway (Bar et al., 2006). PFC areas use such information to form a general sketch of the
perceived object. Such general information is sent to inferior temporal cortex where it is used as
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an ‘initial guess’ of what the object can be and it is compared against the more detailed object
analysis performed by the bottom-up processes (Bar, 2003, 2006).
The orbital prefrontal cortex is the specific area that sends the information to inferior
temporal cortex (Bar, 2006). There is some evidence that this area analyzes visual information
(e.g., Szatkowska, Grabowska, & Szymanska, 2001). It is also associated with guessing,
hypothesis testing, and expectation generation (e.g., Petrides, Alivisatos, & Frey, 2002). Bar
(2006) was able to show that visual information is active 50 ms earlier in the orbital PFC than in
inferior temporal cortex. However, this was only true when the stimuli consisted of images with
low spatial frequency. These findings are strong support for Bar’s model.
PFC Involvement in Picture Priming
Repetition priming in picture identification refers to the facilitation obtained the second
or subsequent times an item is processed. Such facilitation is shown in reductions of reaction
time (e.g., Bartram, 1974) and neural responses (e.g., Ghuman, Bar, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2008).
More specifically, occipitotemporal cortex shows reductions in activity as a result of repeated
exposure to objects (van Turennout, 2003). Neurons within the inferotemporal cortex show firing
reductions when animals perform repeated visual tasks (Ringo, 1996). Ventral temporal cortex
and frontal cortex also show reduced neural response using fMRI measures (Eriksson, Larsson,
& Nyberg, 2008; Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006). Interestingly, MEG measures suggest
that priming effects in ventral temporal cortex arise only after feedback from frontal cortex
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006).
Moreover, the interaction between top-down and bottom-up processes seems to be
necessary in long-term repetition priming (Ghuman, Bar, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2008). There is
some evidence that disrupting the left inferior frontal gyrus by using TMS at encoding largely
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reduced behavioral (response times) and neural long-term priming effects in picture
identification (Wig et al., 2005). They also showed that early perceptual priming was unaffected
by TMS suggesting that priming can be separated into conceptual and perceptual areas.
Behavioral studies with bilinguals also have shown that repetition priming in picture naming is
based in part on speeded object identification processes and part on word retrieval and
production (e.g., Francis, Corral, Jones, & Sáenz, 2008). The present study mainly focused on
object identification processes.
Stankiewicz, Hummel, and Cooper (1998) were not able to find long-term priming effects
when they got participants to ignore targets by having them name another object presented
simultaneously. This result suggests the central role of attention in long-term priming. In another
experiment they showed the influence of attention in short-term priming. Attended and ignored
items both produced significant short-term priming. However, ignored items showed smaller
priming effects than attended items, indicating that attention is important in short-term priming.
As mentioned earlier, attention is strongly associated with top-down processes, specifically with
PFC and PC. Thus, these last two behavioral experiments not only support the involvement of
top-down processes in long-term priming but also in short-term priming. In contrast, Gabrieli et
al. (1999) were not able to find a reduction in long-term priming for picture naming when
attention was divided by holding in mind a ‘digit-letter string’ as they named a picture. Such
counterintuitive findings may be the result of methodological differences. For example, it may be
the case that attention was not truly divided as participants were exposed to the picture, and as a
result priming was not affected.
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1.3 Present Study Justification
The common idea across the four experiments performed was to test the impact of topdown processes across different perceptual tasks. In order to do that, participants were asked to
perform an n-back task concurrent with the main task (i.e., change blindness, object recognition,
and repetition priming) in each experiment. The intention was to ‘steal’ resources from highlevel processing areas (e.g., PFC and PC) with the n-back task, and test whether this would affect
performance on the main tasks. In general, the n-back task consists of comparing a specific item
with another item presented n trials before. For example, a 2-back task requires comparing
whether a number is same or different to another number that appeared two places back.
The n-back task was chosen as secondary task based on previous research that shows its
strong association with working memory and executive functioning (Jonides et al., 1997).
Moreover, a quantitative meta-analysis on neuroimaging studies showed that lateral and medial
posterior parietal cortex, lateral and medial premotor cortex, dorsolateral and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, and frontal poles are the main areas involved in the n-back task (see Owen,
McMillan, Laird, & Bullmore, 2005). These areas are correlated with attention and working
memory processes (Owen et al., 2005). Concurrent n-back and antisaccade task performance also
support the involvement of PFC in the n-back task (Mitchell, Macrae, & Gilchrist, 2002). That is,
human patients with prefrontal damage (Guitton, Büchtel & Douglas, 1985), and normal humans
performing an n-back (Mitchell et al., 2002) both show a detriment in saccade control. Thus,
these neurological and behavioral evidence support the involvement of specific high-level brain
areas (e.g., PFC) in the n-back task.
It is possible that the impact of the n-back on the primary tasks is produced merely by the
act of doing two tasks simultaneously. In order to avoid this potential confound, a number
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repetition activity was chosen as a control task. Just like in the n-back task participants had to
listen to numbers and vocally report answers. However, the main difference between the two was
that the n-back task required the use of working memory resources while the number repetition
task did not. In this way, while participants performed two tasks simultaneously in both test and
control conditions, only the former will require the use of top-down processes. Previous evidence
has shown that a number repetition task does not require significant use of top-down processes
(Robertson, Hager, & Heron, 1994). Specifically, it was shown that a number repetition activity
produced fewer errors in an antisaccade task than an arithmetic task. As mentioned before,
antisaccade tasks are strongly associated with executive functions (Mitchell et al., 2002).
Therefore, the number repetition task seems to have little effect on executive functions
(Robertson, et al., 1994).
Four experiments were performed. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether top-down
processes influences change detection and object recognition respectively. Experiments 3 and 4
explored the function of top-down processes on picture repetition short- and long-term priming
respectively. It has been suggested that attention plays an important top-down role in object
recognition (e.g., Sùper, 2005; Serre et al., 2007). Specifically, attention seems essential in
detecting a specific object among many other objects. It has even been suggested that PFC aids
in the perceptual recognition of the object (Bar, 2003). Thus, for Experiment 1, participants
performed a variation of a change detection task, while their top-down resources were used in an
n-back task. It was tested whether change detection is reduced or slowed when the top-down
resources are allocated to an alternative task. For Experiment 2, the effects of top-down
processes on object identification were tested. Participants used their top-down resources in nback task as they tried to identify pictures. Similarly, for Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 it was
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tested whether priming effects are reduced, if during the encoding phase top-down resources are
used in an n-back task. This seems plausible since Wig et al., (2005) were able to show that
disrupting the PFC using TMS reduced neural and behavioral indicators of facilitation effects in
a repetition-priming task.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Previous findings show that the dorsolateral PFC is active during the performance of
working memory tasks (Owen, 2000). Lesions to this area are also associated with impairments
in directing attention to relevant information (Dias, Robbins, & Robers, 1996). Thus, for
Experiment 1 we tested behaviorally whether PFC processing is necessary for change detection
in complex photographs. Participants performed simultaneously a change detection task using a
flickering paradigm (based on Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997) and a secondary task (i.e.,
either an n-back or a number repetition task). The change detection task consisted of the
following. Within a trial, two similar photographs alternated rapidly for 20 cycles. Participants
had to detect a specific difference between the two pictures. It was predicted that participants
would take longer or fail to detect changes when they performed a simultaneous n-back task than
when they performed a number repetition task. If top-down processes are necessary for detecting
the change, then participants would show more errors in the test condition (i.e., n-back task) then
in the control condition (i.e., number repetition task).
2.1 Methods
Participants
Forty university students were recruited for this experiment from the University of Texas
at El Paso and from the Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. There were 20 women and 20
men. The average age was 24.6 years. One participant was replaced for not following the task
instructions. Participants were native speakers of either English or Spanish, and received course
credit for participating.
Apparatus
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Stimuli were presented on the monitor of a Macintosh G4 computer using PsyScope
software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). A PsyScope button box (New Micros,
Dallas, TX) was used to record participants’ responses.
Design
Experiment 1 had a one-way repeated-measures design. The independent variable was the
secondary task, (1) a PFC task condition (performing an n-back task) and (2) a control task
(repeating numbers). Response times and error rates were used as the dependent variables.
Materials
Eighty pairs of photographs were used. Each pair consisted of a photo that depicted a
complex scene, and a replication of this photo that was edited by changing a specific object or
feature. An example is given in Figure 1. Forty pairs of photographs were used for the n-back
condition, and the other 40 were used for the number repetition condition. The assignment of
pairs to conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Eighty auditory strings of numbers
(from 1 to 5) were used for the secondary tasks.
Procedure
Experiment 1 consisted of one session and lasted about 45 minutes. The conditions were
blocked by the secondary task condition, with 4 practice and 40 experimental trials for the nback task and 4 practice and 40 trials for the number repetition task. The presentation order of
the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants.
For the primary task, on each trial participants viewed two alternating versions of the
same photo (for a maximum of 20 times each), and they had to judge what was different between
them. They had to press a button the moment they detected the change. While they were trying to
detect the change, participants performed a secondary task. A sequence of numbers was
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presented, and participants had to perform either an n-back task or a number repetition task.
Numbers were presented in either English or Spanish depending on the dominant language of
participants. For the n-back task, they had to mentally compare each number they heard with two
numbers back and report aloud whether the numbers were the same or different. For the number
repetition task they only had to repeat the numbers they heard throughout the trial. They stopped
performing the secondary task the moment they detected the change between the pictures or
when the trial ended. Also, after they indicated detecting the change by pressing a button, they
had to report the difference between the two photos presented (if they detected one).
Figure 2 shows a visual representation of an experimental trial. At the beginning of each
trial a ‘plus’ sign appeared on the screen until participants pressed the space bar to start, then the
screen went blank for 3000 ms. At 1000 ms, the first digit was presented. The 2nd, 3rd, and 7th
digits began 2500 ms after the onset of the previous digit respectively. The 4th, 5th, and 6th began
2000 after the onset of the previous digits. (On average, there were 2250 ms after the onset of
each digit). Last digit onset was 14500 ms after initiation of trial.
A visual mask appeared 3000 ms after the trial began and remained on the screen for
1000 ms, then the first photo appeared. The purpose for showing the visual stimuli 3000 ms after
the auditory stimuli allowed participants to occupy themselves with the alternative task before
beginning to search for the visual change. The first photo appeared for 240 ms, then a mask
appeared for 80 ms, then the second photo appeared for 240 ms, then the mask appear again for
80 ms and so on. This cycle was presented continuously up to 20 times unless participants were
able to detect the change before the end of the trial (up to 16800 ms after the start of the trial).
Participants were instructed to press a button the moment they detected the change. Response
times were measured from the onset of the first picture to the button press response. The button
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press stopped the cycle, and one of the two photos appeared on the screen. At this point
participants could point directly to the picture and explain to the experimenter where and/or what
was the change. The complete trial lasted around 20 sec.
2.2 Results
The dependent variables showed high variability across items. Therefore two types of
analyses were done. The first analysis was the standard analysis that treats participants as a
random factor with performance averaged across items. The second analysis was an item
analysis in which performance for each item was averaged across participants and items were
treated as a random factor. Error rates are often transformed using an arcsine function to
accommodate the multiplicative nature of probabilities. Given that this transformation did not
change the main conclusions of the present study, the untransformed error values are reported for
Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, arcsine transformed error rates are reported in the
appendix. Response times were somewhat skewed. However, it was not necessary to correct for
skew in the inferential analyses, because of the central limit theorem, given that there were more
than 12 participants per condition and that the use of a within-subjects design ensured equal
sample sizes for the different experimental conditions (Keppel & Wickens, 2004).
Error Rates
A trial was considered to have a response error when participants pressed the button to
indicate that a change was detected but reported incorrectly or were not able to report the change
between two pictures. Sometimes participants were not able to vocally report what was the
change, but they were able to point to the area where the change happened. These types of
responses were not considered errors. An analysis was performed for errors in which participants
pressed the button but they were not able to correctly report the change, showing that there was
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no difference between the n-back (M = 2.2%, SD = 3.1) and the number repetition (M = 1.6%,
SD = 3.3) conditions, t(39) = 1.57, p = .124. The item analysis also showed no difference
between the n-back (M = 2.2%, SD = 4.2) and the number repetition (M = 1.6%, SD = 4.0)
conditions, t(39) = 1.22, p = .228.
A more common error type was simply running out of time to detect the change. That is,
the change was not detected within the time allocated for the trial. Therefore, this error type is
thought to reflect timing rather than a mistaken identification. A dependent samples t-test was
performed to compare time-out error rates in the n-back versus the number repetition conditions.
The n-back condition (M = 16.4%, SD = 8.7) showed significantly more time-out errors than the
number repetition condition (M = 10.2%, SD = 5.2), t(39) = 4.81, p < .001. The item analysis
also showed significantly more time-outs for the n-back (M = 16.4%, SD = 20.6) than the
number repetition (M = 10.2%, SD = 16.4) conditions, t(39) = 5.26, p < .001. Note that the
variability was larger for the item analysis than for the participant analysis.
Response Times
For the response time analysis, only correct responses were included. Responses were
considered correct when participants reported detection of the change by pressing a button and
by correctly reporting what the change was. Timing was relative to the onset of the first
photograph. A dependent samples t-test was performed on response times for the n-back
condition (M = 4368.8, SD = 660) and the number repetition condition (M = 4274, SD = 536).
The difference between the two was not significant t(39) = .08, p = .453. An item analysis was
performed. One item was excluded from the analysis because only three participants detected its
change. A dependent samples t-test showed longer response times for the n-back condition (M =
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4740.2, SD = 1993) than for the number repetition condition (M = 4470.5, SD = 1894), t(78) =
2.4, p = .019.
2.3 Discussion
As expected, participants detected fewer changes and were slower in the n-back than in
the number repetition condition, based on the response times and proportions of trials for which
the time to detect a change ran out. These findings confirm the predictions of top-down
processing involvement in change detection tasks. As mentioned earlier, top-down attentional
processes are involved in visual working memory (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). Hence, the
present findings support the involvement of visual working memory in change detection tasks.
Specifically, it supports the idea that sustained attention is necessary to maintain visual
information in working memory because attentional disruptions from the n-back task worsened
performance.
Rensink (1997) showed that changes in areas of central interest were identified faster
than changes in areas of marginal interest. He then suggested that such differences are the result
of more attentional attraction towards areas with ‘high-level interest’. However, it is also
possible that changes in areas of central interest also require less attentional resources because
they are processed faster. Thus, it is likely that a task such as the n-back may have less impact in
changes occurring in central interest areas than in changes occurring in marginal interest areas.
Further research is required to statistically test differences between pictures with marginal and
central interest in a concurrent performance of a change-detection and an n-back task.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 tested behaviorally whether top-down processes are necessary for object
recognition. Participants performed an object recognition task and a secondary task (i.e., either
an n-back task or a number repetition task) simultaneously. Within each trial, pictures were
presented briefly (500 ms or less). Participants had to recognize each picture while they
performed a secondary task and verify that recognition by naming it afterwards. It was predicted
that participants would show slower response times and higher error rates in recognizing pictures
when they performed a simultaneous n-back task than when they performed a simultaneous
number-repetition task.
Previous research (e.g., Bar, 2003) suggests that detecting the effects of PFC on object
recognition is more likely if the images are difficult to perceive. To vary the level of difficulty in
perceiving the images, pictures were presented for different periods of time (50, 100, 500 ms).
This allowed us to test whether the PFC impact is greater for briefly presented images than for
images presented for longer time periods.
3.1 Methods
Participants
There were 48 participants (29 women and 19 men). All were university students from
the University of Texas at El Paso. The mean age was 20 years. Participants were native speakers
of English or Spanish and they received course credit for participating. Three people were
replaced because the computer crashed during the experiment. Three more were replaced
because they correctly named less than three pictures in the 100 ms condition. Seven participants
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correctly named less than three pictures within the 50 ms condition. However, those participants
were not replaced.
Apparatus
The present experiment used the same equipment in Experiment 1.
Design
Experiment 2 had a 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) repeated-measures design.
The presentation time of each picture was either 50 ms, 100 ms, or 500 ms. The secondary task
was performing either a PFC task (i.e., an n-back task) or a control task (i.e., number repetition
task). The dependent variables were response times and error rates for picture recognition.
Materials
The critical stimuli were 126 digitized drawings of common objects. These pictures were
randomly assigned to 6 groups of 21 pictures. The assignment of picture sets to conditions was
counterbalanced. Also, 126 auditory sequences of 7 numbers (from 1 to 5) were used for the
secondary tasks, with 21 auditory sequences randomly assigned to each condition. A native
speaker of English and a native speaker of Spanish recorded the numbers. Since many of the
participants were either English or Spanish dominant, we wanted them to hear the numbers in
their dominant language. The reason for this was that it is very difficult to perform mental
arithmetic in the non-dominant language.
Procedure
The experiment was completed in a single one-hour session and participants were tested
individually. The trials were blocked by the secondary task (doing either the n-back or number
repetition task concurrently). At the beginning of the n-back condition block, 5 practice trials
were given in which participants had to identify a picture presented for 500 ms while performing
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an n-back task. At the beginning of the easier number repetition condition, only 3 practice trials
were given, also with a 500 ms presentation time. Within each secondary task block, the 63
experimental trials were further blocked by the presentation time (pictures were shown for either
50, 100, or 500 ms). Participants were warned of the speed of presentation before each change.
The orders of the different concurrent task and presentation time blocks were counterbalanced to
control for order effects.
On each trial, a picture was presented and participants had to report whether they were
able to identify the picture or not. They had to press the ‘yes’ button if they were able to identify
the picture or not press anything if they did not see the picture. At the end of each trial, they
reported the name of the picture. At the same time as they tried to identify the pictures,
participants had to perform an n-back task or a number repetition task with numbers presented
auditorially. For the n-back task, they had to compare mentally each number they heard with the
number they heard two numbers back and report aloud whether each number was the same or
different. For the number repetition task, they just had to repeat immediately each number that
they heard.
Figure 3 illustrates what happened on each trial. At the beginning a ‘plus’ sign was
presented on the computer screen as a fixation point. Participants pressed the space bar to start
the trial. At this point, the screen went blank and participants began to hear a sequence of seven
digits across a 13300 ms interval. The onsets of the numbers were 2 sec apart. This spacing was
meant to allow sufficient processing time to perform the n-back task accurately. For the n-back
task, participants compared these numbers mentally and reported aloud if the corresponding
numbers were the same or different. For the control task, participants repeated aloud each of the
numbers they heard immediately after they heard it.
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Each picture appeared at one of three different times after the 3rd, 4th, or 5th number
across the different trials. The reason for varying the onset time was to prevent participants from
predicting at what moment each picture would appear. Pictures were presented until the 3rd
number because that was when participants start responding to the n-back task, allowing
participants to be engaged in it before seeing the pictures. The assignment of each picture to a
specific onset time was counterbalanced across the different trials. Pictures were presented for 50
ms, 100 ms, or 500 ms. A mask of 250 ms preceded and succeeded each picture. This mask was
constructed with scribbles resembling some of the lines and curves from the drawings used (see
Figure 3), and its purpose was to increase recognition difficulty. When the picture appeared, the
participants reported whether they were able to recognize the picture by pressing the ‘Yes’
button as quickly as possible or by not pressing anything otherwise. After that, the screen was
blank for the remaining time during which the numbers were presented. At the end of the trial,
when the fixation sign ‘+’ appeared again, participants had to report aloud the name of the
presented picture.
3.2 Results
Error Rates
As mentioned before, participants had to report the name of each of the pictures
presented. Answers were considered erroneous when they failed to report the name (e.g., saying
‘don’t know’), or said an incorrect one, or when they failed to press the button. Trials on which
participants pressed before the picture appeared were not considered errors if the picture was
named correctly. Error rates are presented in Table 1.
A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on error rates.
First, there was a significant main effect of presentation time, F(2, 94) = 265.40, MSE = 9.401, p
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< .001, showing that error rates decreased with longer presentation time. Planned comparisons
showed that there were more errors for the 50 ms condition than for the 100 and 500 ms
conditions, [F(1, 47) = 263.215, MSE = 8.883, p < .001; F(1, 47) = 394.892, MSE = 11.979, p <
.001]. Also there were more errors for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms condition, F(1,
47) = 56.807, MSE = 7.343, p < .001. Participants showed significantly more errors in picture
identification when they performed the n-back task than when they performed the number
repetition task, F(1, 47) = 42.561, MSE = 6.720, p < .001. This was true for the 50, 100, and 500
ms conditions, [t(47) = 5.244, p < .001; t(47) = 15.631, p < .001; t(47) = 5.453, p < .001]. There
interaction between secondary task and presentation time was not significant, F(2, 94) = 2.193,
MSE = 3.706, p = .117.
Error Types
Although no hypotheses were made a priori about the nature of the errors that would
occur, interesting observations by the experimenters led to an examination of error types. About
17.9% of the trials (68.1% of error trials) had no attempt to state what picture had appeared (i.e.,
don’t know responses). These errors or identification failures were more common in the n-back
(M = 23.28%) than in the number repetition condition (M = 13.96%), t(47) = 9.487, p < .001. In
fact, although not recorded systematically by the experimenters, on many occasions while
performing the n-back task, participants questioned whether a picture had in fact been presented.
On about 0.8% of all trials (3.1% of error trials) participants correctly identified the object but
failed to press the button. For this type of error there was no difference between the n-back (M =
0.83%) and the number repetition conditions (M = 0.86%), t(47) = .093, p = .926.
On about 7.6% of all trials (28.8% of error trials), participants gave responses that were
unacceptable as interpretations of the stimulus pictures. For these types of errors, there were no
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differences between the n-back (M = 8.17%) and the number repetition condition (M = 7.94%),
t(47) = .276, p = .784. Some errors clearly referred to pictures presented on recent trials and were
not perceptually related to the target stimulus (e.g., saying pumpkin when a door was presented
or mountains when a spider was presented). Some errors were items that were closely related
functionally or conceptually as well as visually (e.g., saying hand for a glove, broom for a mop,
or saying fish for a whale), so it was unclear what was the source of the error. This type of error
is common in picture naming experiments with pictures presented in full view.
However, an error type not typically seen in picture naming studies also emerged in the
50 and 100 ms conditions. Several error responses were objects that shared general shape
characteristics but not fine-grained details with the actual stimulus object. For example, multiple
participants identified the skirt as a cone, the monkey as a man, boy, or person, the binoculars as
bottles, the telescope as a pencil, the iron as a boat or ship, or the aquarium (filled with water and
fish) as a box. The classification of error types for several other items was ambiguous (because
of conceptual or functional similarity or because the visual errors were common in normal
picture naming. However, these errors were clearly more frequent for the 50 ms and for the 100
ms conditions than for the 500 ms condition.
Response Times
Response times were analyzed using only correctly identified pictures (i.e., they were
identified on button-press and correctly named). If participants did not pressed the button when a
picture was presented or if they did not say the correct name of the pictures presented, the trials
were removed. Also, response times less than 200 ms, more than 3000 ms, or three standard
deviations away from the mean of the condition were removed as outliers (this procedure
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removed trials on which they pressed the button before the picture appeared). Response times are
presented in Table 1.
A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on identification
response times. There was a main effect of presentation time, F(2, 92) = 4.324, MSE = 10049, p
= .016. Planned comparisons showed no significant differences between the 50 and the 100 ms
condition or for the 50 and the 500 ms conditions [F(1, 46) = 3.237, MSE = 9884, p = .079; F(1,
46) = 1.203, MSE = 10711, p = .278]. However participants were faster for the 100 ms condition
than for the 500 ms condition, F(1, 46) = 9.480, MSE = 9354, p = .003. The main effect of
secondary task was not significant, F(1, 46) = .849, MSE = 14937, p = .362. Individual
comparisons showed that while there were no significant differences between the n-back and the
control conditions for the 50 and the 100 ms [t(46) = .663, p = .511; t(47) = 1.312, p = .196], the
difference in the 500 ms condition approached significance, t(47) = 1.993, p = .052. The 500 ms
condition effect suggests that participants were slower to identify pictures when they performed
the n-back than when they performed the number repetition condition. The interaction between
presentation time and secondary task was not significant, F(2, 92) = 1.798, MSE = 8858, p =
.171.
3.3 Discussion
For all presentation times, there were significantly more errors for the n-back condition
than in the control condition, suggesting that disrupting top-down processes reduces the ability to
identify objects. Response times only showed an effect approaching significance for the 500 ms
condition. For the shorter presentation times (50 and 100 ms) the effects were not even close to
significant possibly because their scores were highly variable. This variability was the result of
fewer correct trials within these two conditions, given that only trials with correctly identified
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pictures went into the analysis. It is also possible that with more participants these effects would
be more stable. An analysis with the combined data of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 will be presented
in a later section.
In relation to error types, within the 50 and 100 ms conditions participants sometimes
were not aware of the presentation of the target picture. That is, they reported that they did not
see any picture (rather than reporting that they saw a picture but were not able to identify what it
was). This suggests that disruption of top-down processes sometimes produced a brief blind
period, even when participants knew ahead of time that a picture was going to appear. Another
interesting type of error was reporting the name of an object that is similar in terms of shape to
the presented object (e.g., men for monkey). This specific type of error suggests that participants
were not able to capture the details of the pictures quickly enough for an accurate identification.
There were significant effects of presentation time in error rates, with higher error rates
for shorter presentation times. In the response time analysis, faster responses were indicated for
the 100 ms than the 500 ms condition, but this was not a predicted effect. The presentation time
effects will be discussed further in the context of the combined analysis of Experiment 2, 3, and
4 picture identification data.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3
Previous studies have shown that short-term priming effects are bigger than long-term
priming effects, and there seem to be different factors that affect each one (Stankiewicz, et al.,
1998). It may be the case that the influence of top-down processes varies for short-term and
long-term priming. Experiment 3 tested behaviorally whether top-down processing affects shortterm repetition priming (Experiment 4 examined long-term priming). Within each trial,
participants were primed with a picture as they performed either an n-back task or a number
repetition task. Both secondary tasks required speaking numbers aloud. This was meant to
produce a bottleneck effect during which participants would be prevented from covertly naming
the pictures during the first phase of the experiment. That is, the phonological selection of each
number excluded the possibility of simultaneously retrieving the names of the pictures (see
Ferreira & Pashler, 2002). At the end of the trial, they were presented either with the same or a
different picture, and they had to name it. We expected less priming when the n-back task was
performed than when the control task was performed.
4.1 Methods
Participants
Forty-eight students from the University of Texas at El Paso and the Universidad
Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez participated for course credit. There were 28 women and 20 men
and their mean age was 22 years. Eight additional participants completed the protocol but were
excluded and replaced. Seven participants were replaced because they reported seeing fewer than
3 of the pictures presented for one of the conditions (usually for the n-back 100 ms condition),
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and one failed to perform the n-back task correctly. Participants were native speakers of either
English or Spanish.
Apparatus
The present experiment used the same equipment in Experiment 1, but it also required a
high-impedance microphone for recording vocal response times.
Design
Experiment 3 had a 2 (secondary task) X 2 (presentation time) X 2 (picture status)
repeated-measures design. For the secondary task condition, participants either performed an nback task or a number repetition task (the same tasks from the previous experiments). The time
pictures were presented was either 100 ms or 500 ms. The 2 pictures presented on each trial were
either the same or different. The ‘different’ condition trials were used as controls. Response
times and error rates in identifying the 1st picture were recorded. Response times to name the 2nd
picture were used to measure short-term priming.
Materials
For Experiment 3, 120 digitized pictures were used. From these, 40 pictures were used
for the same condition and 80 were used for the different condition. There were twice as many
pictures for the different condition because two different pictures are needed to make each trial.
Pictures were counterbalanced across the different conditions. Also 80 auditory strings of
numbers (from 1 to 5) were used for the n-back and number repetition tasks.
Procedure
Participants had to identify pictures as they simultaneously performed an n-back or a
number repetition task. At the end of each trial, a second picture was presented and participants
had to name it. The experimental trials were blocked by the secondary task condition. For the n-
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back block, 5 practice trials were given in which the prime picture was presented for 500 ms, 3
trials in which the first and the second picture were the same and 2 trials in which both pictures
were different. The 40 experimental trials followed. For the number-repetition block, 3 practice
trials were given with the prime picture presented for 500 ms, 1 with the same and 2 with
different prime and test pictures. In a second block of 40 trials, participants had to perform all the
trials in which they had to do the number repetition task. Within each secondary task block, trials
were blocked by presentation time (100 or 500 ms). Participants were warned of the speed of
presentation before each change. Orders of the secondary task and presentation time blocks were
counterbalanced across participants. Trials for the ‘same’ (i.e., same picture is presented across
the trial) and ‘different’ (i.e., two different pictures are presented across the trial) conditions were
mixed randomly within each block.
As illustrated in Figure 4, trial structure and timing were the same as in Experiment 2 up
through presentation of the last digit of the secondary task, including variation of when the prime
picture appeared. After the 7th digit was presented, 4.7 sec on average passed before the second
picture appeared. The purpose for this was to avoid the possibility that the vocal responses for
the alternative tasks would interfere with picture naming. After the final n-back task or number
repetition response was given, at least 2 sec passed before the 2nd picture appeared and stayed on
the screen until they named it. This picture was either the same picture as the picture presented
previously within the trial or a different one. Participants had to name this picture as quickly as
possible. The lag from the offset of the prime picture to the onset of the target varied from 6 to 9
seconds depending on when the prime picture was presented.
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4.2 Results
Error Rates in Recognition of Prime Picture
Responses were coded as errors when participants pressed the ‘no’ button indicating that
they were not able to see the picture or when they failed to press any of the two buttons. Error
rates are presented in Table 2. A 2 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task at encoding) ANOVA
was performed on picture identification error rates. There was a main effect of presentation time,
F(1, 47) = 37.381, MSE = 4.566, p < .001, with more errors when pictures were presented for
100 ms than when they were presented for 500 ms. This was true for the n-back task and for the
number-repetition task, [t(47) = 5.184, p < .001; t(47) = 5.338, p < .001]. There was also a main
effect of secondary task at encoding, F(1, 47) = 11.121, MSE = 2.731, p = .002, with more errors
when participants performed the n-back task than when they performed the number repetition
task. This effect was significant for both the 100 ms and 500 ms conditions, [t(47) = 2.680,
p = .010; t(47) = 2.611, p = .012]. The interaction between presentation time and secondary task
was not significant, F(1, 47) = .160, MSE = 1.627, p = .691.
Response Times in Recognition of Prime Picture
Only correctly identified pictures, where participants reported seeing the picture by
pressing the ‘yes’ button were used. Responses that lasted less than 200 ms, more than 3000 ms,
or three standard deviations away from the mean of the condition were removed. Response times
are given in Table 2. A 2 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task at encoding) ANOVA was
performed on picture identification response times. The effect of presentation time was almost
significant, F(1, 47) = 3.495, MSE = 47885, p = .068, in the direction of shorter response times
for the 100 ms in contrast with the 500 ms condition. The effect reached significance for the
number repetition condition but not for the n-back condition [t(47) = 2.073, p = .044; t(47) =
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1.182, p = .243]. There was a significant main effect of secondary task at encoding, F(1,
47) = 14.075, MSE = 55476, p < .001, with longer response times for the n-back than for the
number repetition task. This difference was significant for both the 100 ms and 500 ms
conditions, [t(47) = 4.175, p < .001; t(47) = 2.482, p = .017]. The interaction between secondary
task and presentation time was not significant, F(1, 47) = .005, MSE = 29201, p = .944.
Response Times for Naming Test Pictures
The naming response times from the test task were analyzed. Response times were
analyzed using only trials in which the 1st picture was identified (when participants pressed the
‘yes’ button) and the 2nd picture was correctly named. As in the previous experiments, response
times less than 200 ms, more than 3000 ms, or more than three standard deviations away from
the mean of the condition were removed. Naming response times and priming scores are given in
Table 3.
A 2 (picture status) X 2 (secondary task at encoding) X 2 (presentation time) ANOVA
was performed on picture naming response times. A significant main effect of picture status
showed that there was facilitation when the two pictures were the same relative to when they
were different, F(1, 47) = 97.076, MSE = 26378, p < .001. Response times were significantly
longer for the n-back than for the number repetition condition, F(1, 47) = 25.635, MSE = 51702,
p < .001. Most importantly, there was a significant interaction between picture status and
secondary task at encoding, F(1, 47) = 57.256, MSE = 11860, p < .001, indicating weaker
facilitation for the n-back than for the number repetition condition. When the pictures were
different, response times for the n-back and the number repetition conditions did not differ,
t(47) = 1.264, p = .213. However when pictures were the same, response times were longer for
the n-back condition than for the number repetition condition, t(47) = 8.059, p < .001. Response
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times did not differ between the 100 and 500 ms conditions, F(1, 47) = .730, MSE = 19357, p =
.397. The two-way-interactions between presentation time and picture status, and between
presentation time and secondary task were not significant, [F(1, 47) = .185, MSE = 10101, p =
.669; F(1, 47) = 2.267, MSE = 15879, p = .139]. The three-way interaction also was not
significant, F(1, 47) = .003, MSE = 9751, p = .959.
4.3 Discussion
For prime picture identification, as in Experiment 2 there were significantly more errors
for the n-back than for the number repetition condition. There were also significantly slower
response times for the n-back condition than for the number repetition condition. Recall that for
Experiment 2, response times were larger numerically for the n-back than for the number
repetition condition but did not reach statistical significance. For the response times, the effect of
presentation time approached significance showing shorter response times for the 100 ms than
for the 500 ms condition only for the number repetition task. As in Experiment 2, the interaction
between response times and secondary tasks was not significant, suggesting that the n-back task
affected the two presentation times similarly.
Within response times for test pictures, as expected there was priming for the ‘same’
condition relative to the ‘different’ condition. However, the most important finding was that
there was less priming for the n-back condition than for the number repetition condition. This
result confirms that top-down processes are involved in short-term priming effects in picture
identification. This was consistent with a previous study in which participants were presented
simultaneously with two pictures but were instructed to attend only to one (Stankiewicz et al.,
1998). Priming effects were reduced for the unattended pictures suggesting that attention plays
an important role in short-term priming. Thus, the study from Stankiewicz et al (1998) and the
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present study showed very similar results using two different methods to interrupt short-term
priming. This supports the idea that top-down and attentional processes are related, and that
attention is important in short-term priming.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 tested behaviorally whether performing a top-down processes task reduces
long-term priming effects. This is different from Experiment 3, which tested whether top-down
processing affects short-term repetition priming. The experiment was divided in two stages. In
the first stage, participants had to identify a group of pictures by pressing a button, using a
procedure similar to that of Experiment 2. During the second stage, participants named the
pictures presented during the first stage along with new pictures not previously presented.
In the first stage, participants had to identify pictures while simultaneously performing
either an n-back task a number repetition task. Similarly to Experiment 3, both secondary tasks
required speaking numbers aloud to prevent from covertly naming the pictures during the first
phase of the experiment. We predicted that the results from the first stage would replicate the
results from Experiment 2. For this stage, the response times were recorded from the onset of
each picture to the moment they were named. The response times from the first stage were
analyzed to see whether participants took longer to identify a picture when they were doing an nback task than when they were doing a number repetition task.
The response times from the second stage were used to measure and compare long-term
priming effects across conditions (priming in the secondary task at encoding condition relative to
new items). We predicted that the priming effects in picture naming would be reduced for the
trials in which an n-back task was performed. More specifically, the allocation of top-down
resources to the n-back task would reduce the long-term priming effects in the object
identification process of picture naming. Previous evidence showed that the ventrolateral PFC is
associated with the direct intention to remember visual information (e.g., Henson, Shallie, &
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Dolan, 1999). That is, this area was active when participants were instructed to remember visual
displays, but not when they were only instructed to look at them. Thus, it is possible that dividing
attention with the n-back task may affect the PFC and as a consequence disrupt the long-term
priming effects.
5.1 Methods
Participants
Sixty-four students were recruited from the University of Texas at El Paso and the
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez. There were 31 women and 33 men. The mean age was
21.4 years. Participants were native speakers of English or Spanish. Participants received course
credit for participating. There were 16 additional participants who were excluded and replaced.
The cause for 10 replacements was that participants reported seeing fewer than 3 pictures for one
or more conditions (mainly for 50 and 100 ms test conditions). Four participants were replaced
because they showed a strange response pattern when reporting whether they were able to see the
pictures (e.g., reporting that they saw none or all of the pictures) and there was some concern that
they did not follow the instructions. Two participants were replaced because the computer
crashed.
Apparatus
The present experiment used the same equipment used for Experiment 3.
Design
Experiment 4 had a 3 (presentation time at encoding) X 2 (secondary task at encoding)
repeated-measures design with a new-item control condition (also within-subjects). The
presentation time of each picture at encoding was either 50, 100, or 500 ms. The secondary task
at encoding was either performing an n-back or a number repetition task. The n-back and number
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repetition tasks were the same as the ones used for Experiment 1. Response times and error rates
from the encoding phase (i.e., first stage) were recorded. Response times from the test phase (i.e.,
second stage) were used to calculate priming effects.
Materials
For the present experiment 160 digitized pairs of pictures were used. Items were divided
randomly into 8 sets of 20. For each experiment, 6 sets were used for the repeated conditions,
and 2 sets were used as new items (control condition). For the secondary tasks, 120 strings of
seven numbers (from 1 to 5) from Experiment 1 were used.
Procedure
The experiment was divided into two parts, the encoding phase and the test phase. During
the encoding phase, participants tried to identify pictures while either performing an n-back task
or a number repetition task. In this phase, the pictures were presented for 50, 100, or 500 ms, and
participants had to identify each picture by pressing a button. The encoding phase was blocked
by the secondary task and by the presentation time conditions. In one block of trials, participants
had to perform 5 practice and 60 experimental with a concurrent n-back task. In a second block
of trials, participants had to perform 3 practice and 60 experimental trials with a concurrent
number repetition task. Practice trials had 500 ms presentation times, and the sets of
experimental trials were subdivided into three blocks of 20 trials, one for each presentation time
(i.e., 50, 100, and 500 ms). Participants were warned of the speed of presentation before each
change. The orders of the concurrent task and presentation time blocks were counterbalanced
across participants.
The procedure within each encoding-phase trial for Experiment 4, as illustrated in Figure
5 was very similar to that of Experiment 2 (see Figure 3). However, please note that in the
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present experiment participants did not name the pictures during the first phase of the
experiment, they only named them during the second part. This is different from Experiment 2 in
which participants had to name each picture at the end of every trial.
During the test phase, participants had to name 160 pictures, 120 that were presented
during encoding, and 40 new pictures that were not presented during the encoding phase. At the
beginning of this phase, participants performed 5 practice picture-naming trials to get familiar
with the microphone and with the naming task in general. Repeated and new pictures were
randomly intermixed. Pictures were presented one at a time with no mask. Participants had to
name each picture aloud as quickly and accurately as possible and there was no secondary task.
Pictures remained on the screen until a vocal response triggered the voice relay. Vocal response
times were measured, and the experimenter noted any unexpected responses.
5.2 Results
Error Rates in Object Recognition
Responses were coded as errors when participants pressed the ‘no’ button indicating that
they were not able to see the picture or when they failed to press any of the buttons. Error rates
are given in Table 4. A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on
error rates. There was a main effect of presentation time, F(2, 126) = 368.19, MSE = 6.621, p <
.001. Planned comparisons showed more errors for the 50 ms condition than for the 100 or 500
ms conditions [F(1, 63) = 301.209, MSE = 6.537, p < .001; F(1, 63) = 505. 053, MSE = 9.393, p
< .001] . Also there were more errors for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms condition,
F(1, 63) = 152.637, MSE = 3.933, p < .001. There was a main effect of secondary task, F(1,
63) = 23.579, MSE = 7.238, p < .001. That is, there were significantly more errors for the n-back
condition than for the control condition. This difference was significant for the 50, 100, and 500
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ms conditions, [t(63) = 2.760, p = .008; t(63) = 4.564, p < .001; t(63) = 3.637, p = .001]. The
interaction was significant, F(2, 126) = 3.731, MSE = 4.124, p = .027. The effect of secondary
task was bigger for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms condition, F(1, 63) = 11.930,
MSE = 5.071, p < .001. However, the effect of secondary task did not differ for the 50 ms and
100 ms (F(1, 63) = .899, MSE = 10.047, p = .347) or for the 50 ms and 500 ms conditions (F(1,
63) = 2.367, MSE = 9.623, p = .129).
Response Times in Object Recognition
Only correctly identified pictures, where participants reported seeing the picture by
pressing the ‘yes’ button were used. Responses that lasted less than 200 ms, more than 3000 ms,
or three standard deviations away from the mean of the condition were removed. Response times
in object recognition are in Table 4. One participant was excluded from the analysis because all
of his response times were larger than 3000 ms.
A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on identification
response times in the encoding phase. The main effect of presentation time was not significant,
F(2, 124) = .938, MSE = 22346, p = .394. However, there was a main effect of secondary task
showing that participants were slower to respond when they performed the n-back task than
when they performed the number repetition task, F(1, 62) = 8.480, MSE = 63857, p = .005. This
difference was significant for the 50, 100, and 500 ms conditions, [t(62) = 2.374, p = .021;
t(62) = 2.315, p = .024; t(62) = 2.682, p = .009]. The interaction between presentation time and
secondary task was not significant, F(2, 124) = .479, MSE = 12826, p = .620.
Response Times in Picture Naming
Response times in the test phase were analyzed using only pictures that were both
identified in the encoding phase (when participants pressed the ‘yes’ button) and named correctly
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in the test phase. Responses that lasted less than 200 ms, or more than 3000 ms, or were three
standard deviations below or above their corresponding mean were removed. The naming time
from the repeated condition was subtracted from the new condition to calculate priming scores.
Picture naming response times and priming scores are given in Table 5. Priming was not
statistically reliable in any cell (ps > .10). Dependent sample t-tests were performed between the
raw scores from the repeated (pictures presented at encoding) and new-item control condition to
test for significant facilitation or interference effects. There were no significant differences for
the n-back or the number repetition conditions at 50, 100, or 500 ms. Neither the average across
the different time presentations for the n-back condition nor the average for the number
repetition condition was significantly different from the new-item control condition, [t(63) =
.831, p = .409; t(63) = 1.512, p = .135]. These suggest that there were no priming effects for the
test or for the control conditions.
Using these priming scores a 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task at encoding)
ANOVA was performed. There was a main effect of secondary task, F(1, 63) = 5.951,
MSE = 12638, p = .018, with the n-back condition showing lower priming scores than the
number repetition condition. There was no main effect of presentation time, F(2, 126) = 2.218,
MSE = 13056, p = .113, and the interaction was not significant, F(2, 126) = 1.120, MSE = 15344,
p = .330.
5.3 Discussion
In terms of error rates and response times in object recognition, the results from
Experiment 2 and 3 were replicated. As expected, there were slower responses and larger error
rates for the n-back condition than for the number repetition condition. Just like in Experiments 2
and 3, the interaction between time presentation and secondary task was not significant for
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response times. However, in contrast with Experiments 2 and 3, there was a significant
interaction in terms of error rate showing that the effect of the n-back task was larger for the 100
ms than for the 500 ms presentation time.
As expected, there was a significant overall difference in priming scores between the nback and the number repetition conditions. That is, the n-back scores tended towards negative
priming while the number repetition scores showed positive priming effects. However these
results are inconclusive because these scores do not represent significant priming effects (i.e.,
they are not significantly different from zero). This suggests that our assumption that performing
the performing the secondary task would prevent naming was correct. However, the finding that
not even masked pictures presented for 500 ms could produce long-term priming is surprising.
Contrary to what was expected, response times in picture naming showed no significant priming
effects. Many neurological (e.g., Ghuman et al., 2008) and behavioral (Stankiewicz, et al., 1998)
studies support the involvement of top-down processes in long-term priming. These findings
show that it is very likely that the concurrent performance of the n-back task and a picture
identification task will reduce long-term picture priming. Thus, further research is needed in
which the possibilities to produce long-term priming are increased (e.g., presenting pictures for
longer times and without a mask) to test effects of disrupting top-down processes (by concurrent
performance of the n-back task) during encoding.
5.4 Combined Analysis
A combined analysis was performed on the object identification scores from Experiment
1, 2, and 3. There were 160 participants across the 3 experiments. Only the 100 and 500 ms
conditions were used for this combined analysis given that Experiment 3 did not have the 50 ms
condition. The purpose of this analysis was to use the combined power of all three experiments
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to test the key hypothesis about effects of concurrent task and presentation time on object
recognition.
Error Rates in Object Recognition
Error rates are presented in Table 6. A 2 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task)
ANOVA showed that there were more errors for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms
condition, F(1, 159) = 170.937, MSE = 120.294, p < .001. This difference was significant for the
n-back and the number repetition conditions, [t(159) = 11.061, p < .001; t(159) = 10.913,
p < .001]. Also, there were more errors for the n-back than for the number repetition condition,
F(1, 159) = 56.457, MSE = 82.037, p < .001. The interaction between presentation time and
secondary task was significant, F(1, 159) = 8.66, MSE = 53.192, p = .004. The n-back task hurt
performance more in the 100 ms condition than in the 500 ms condition.
Response Times in Object Recognition
Response times are shown in Table 6. A 2 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task)
ANOVA was performed on data from 159 participants. (The same participant that was excluded
from Experiment 4 was again excluded). Response times were faster for the 100 ms condition
than for the 500 ms condition, F(1, 158) = 8.943, MSE = 20815, p = .003. The effect was
significant for both the n-back and the number repetition condition [t(158) = 2.112, p = .036;
t(158) = 2.640, p = .009]. Also, participants were slower for the n-back condition than for the
number repetition condition, F(1, 158) = 23.073, MSE = 32626, p < .001. The interaction
between presentation time and secondary task was not significant, F(1, 158) = .412,
MSE = 11875, p = .522.
Overall, the combined results showed that the n-back task affects object recognition by
increasing error rate and response times. The interaction between presentation time and
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secondary task in terms of error rates showed that the n-back task has a larger effect on shorter
presentation times than the control condition. Unexpectedly, participants were faster for the 100
than for the 500 ms condition. One possible explanation of this finding is that participants
continue to scan the stimulus until it disappears to increase the chances of item recognition. As a
result, they wait until after the item disappears from the screen to initiate the button press, thus
taking them longer to respond in the 500 than in the 100 ms condition. Another possibility is that
the items that would take longer to identify are more likely to be identification failures in the
shorter presentation time conditions and excluded from the response time analysis, leaving only
the easier items which are identified faster for inclusion in the response time analysis.
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CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, I have considered the influence of top-down processes in different visual
abilities. Four experiments tested the effects of an n-back task performed simultaneously with
different visual tasks. It was assumed that performance of the n-back task would use top-down
resources. Thus, if top-down processes were involved in any of the different visual tasks, then
the n-back task would negatively affect visual processing. Specifically, Experiment 1 tested the
impact of an n-back task in a change detection task, and Experiment 2 tested whether the
concurrent performance of an n-back task affects object identification. Experiments 3 and 4
tested whether the performance of an n-back task during picture encoding reduces short- and
long-term priming respectively.
In summary, it was found that the n-back task affected the change detection and object
recognition tasks by increasing error rates and response times. Also, the n-back task reduced
facilitation effects in a short-term priming task. In terms of long-term priming, although the nback condition did show smaller priming effects than the control condition, such difference was
inconclusive given that neither the n-back nor the control condition showed significant priming
effects relative to new items. Thus, taken as a whole, the results indicate that top-down processes
are involved in change detection, object recognition and short-term priming and suggest that they
may also be involved in long-term priming.
6.1 The Role of Attention in Change Detection
Detecting a change is easier when there is a cue to where the change will occur (e.g.,
motion). Change is difficult to detect in a flickering task like the one used in Experiment 1
precisely because there are no such cues available (Rensink, 1997). A mask between the
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flickering images disrupts sensory memory and the sensation of motion that allows us to perceive
movement in movies. Thus, within such tasks, attention needs to be directed serially through the
different areas of the stimulus to detect a change.
Working memory is important in such tasks because the information from one visual item
needs to be compared with the information of a second item after the second item is no longer in
view and has decayed from sensory memory. Previous studies suggest that attended items are
more likely to transfer from sensory memory to visual working memory (e.g., Schmidt et al.,
2002). However, change detection studies suggested that sustained attention is necessary to
maintain visual information in working memory rather than just to transfer it into working
memory (Rensink, 2002). For example, if attention was sufficient to transfer a stable visual
representation of a complex image to working memory within a flickering task, then it would be
easier both to detect changes and to determine that no change occurred. However, the long
response times to detect changes within a flickering task suggest that the search is done serially,
thus supporting the view that attention is needed both to bind the items held in visual short-term
memory to locations and to maintain the binding (Wheeler, & Treisman, 2002). Pessoa, and
Ungerleider (2004) showed overlapping activity in areas involving the PFC and PC when a
change was correctly reported and when a false alarm was reported in a visual working memory
task.
The findings of Experiment 1 showing more errors and longer response times when a
flickering task was presented concurrently with an n-back task can be interpreted according to
Rensink’s view. That is, the simultaneous performance of the n-back task reduced attentional
resources available for the flickering task, thus making it even more difficult to maintain in
working memory the two different versions of an image. It also made more difficult to direct
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attention to the areas where changes may occur. Overall, Experiment 1 confirmed the central role
of attention in change detection tasks.
6.2 Object Identification
The present behavioral findings, in agreement with previous neurological evidence
support the involvement of top-down processing in object identification (Experiments 2, 3, and
4). Specifically, the disruption of top-down processes reduced speed and accuracy in object
identification. There are at least two different possible explanations accounting for these
findings. One explanation claims that top-down influences are only in terms of attention. The
other possible explanation claims top-down influences are in terms of attention but also in terms
of perception. These two explanations are evaluated below in terms of their ability to explain the
object recognition results of Experiments 2, 3, and 4.
The error pattern in the object identification task (Experiment 2) was also of interest.
With very short masked presentation times (50 or 100 ms), participants sometimes gave answers
that were perceptually similar to what the actual object was in terms of general shape (lowfrequency aspects but not details) (e.g., cone for skirt), and although the number of instances was
insufficient for a conclusive determination, these errors occurred numerically more often in the
n-back condition. Participants also sometimes were able to detect parts of the object but were not
able to determine what the actual object was. These types of errors did not occur when pictures
were presented in full view for the picture naming tasks in Experiments 3 or 4.
The Role of Attention in Object Identification
It is possible that such disruption affected neurological activities associated with attention
such as: (1) increasing firing rates of cells responding to the attended object (e.g., Spitzer, et al.,
1988); (2) screening out irrelevant information (e.g., Raynolds, et al., 1999); (3) increasing
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baseline activity before the to-be attended object is presented (e.g., Luck, et al., 1997); and (4)
and enhancing visual contrast (see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). Thus a reduction in attention
can reduce the efficiency of sensory areas making the process of object recognition slower and
more prone to errors.
Another factor that could have affected object recognition is a disruption of normal
saccade processes. As mentioned earlier, performance of an n-back task reduces saccade control
(Mitchell, et al., 2002). It is possible that participants were slower in directing their saccades
toward the pictures, which would affect both error rates and response times. There is a latency of
150 to 175 ms to initiate a saccade, and it takes another 30-50 ms to make the saccade itself,
depending on the visual angle to be traversed (Rayner, 1998). Recall that the mask that preceded
the stimulus in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 was presented for 250 ms. If participants were not
looking directly at the center of the screen, the mask would cue them to initiate a saccade to that
area. Under full attention, 250 ms ought to be enough time to make a saccade on time to the
center of the screen before the stimulus appears. However their attention was occupied by the nback task, which disrupts saccade processing (Mitchell, et al., 2002). In terms of error rates, it is
possible that participants were not able to make a saccade in time to adequately scan the picture.
In terms of response times, it is possible that the saccade disruption caused by the n-back task
made participants to scan the picture at a later time in contrast with the control, thus taking
longer to recognize the pictures. Some support for this explanation was seen in the reports by
several participants that on some n-back trials for short presentation times (50 or 100 ms), they
did not believe that a picture had even been presented. This phenomenon would make sense if
the saccade reached the target location after the picture had offset and they only saw the second
mask.
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The unusual perceptual errors (e.g., perceiving a monkey as a man) that occurred in
Experiment 1 could be caused by decreased attention. Attention reduction can increase the
difficulty of screening out irrelevant information and/or the difficulty of enhancing visual
contrast (e.g., Raynolds, et al., 1999; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). It can also fail to increase
firing rates responding to the attended object before and during the presentation of the object
(Sùper, 2005; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). These factors can create a situation in which
participants do not detect details (high-frequency characteristics) of the objects but only the
overall shape of the objects (low-frequency characteristics), thereby making object recognition
more difficult. Within the attentional view, these types of errors suggest that attention may not
carry visual information, but it is essential to make visual information more accessible.
The Role of Top-Down Perceptual Processes in Object Recognition
A different hypothesis suggests that the influence of top-down processes in object
recognition is in terms of visual perception. Previous research suggests that top-down processes
in the PFC send a visual sketch of a perceived object to the occipitotemporal areas, before lowlevel visual areas finish processing the object (Bar, 2003, 2006). The information sent from highlevel areas to occipitotemporal regions seems to reduce the time it takes to recognize the
perceived object. This hypothesis can also account for the present findings. For example, it is
possible that the PFC was not able to send a sketch of each perceived object, thus increasing the
time it took to identify the object. However, Bar’s model does not predict that disruption of the
PFC would produce more object identification errors. The reason is that in his model, the
bottom-up processes are sufficient to identify the object, and the top-down influences only serve
to facilitate or speed the identification processes. Thus, while the present findings support Bar’s
model by showing that object identification is slowed when top-down processes are disrupted,
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the model is not supported in that more errors were found when top-down processes were
disrupted.
Nevertheless, Bar’s model can account for some unusual errors (e.g., errors in which the
name of an object similar in shape to the actual object was given) made during the 50 ms
condition. That is, given that without top-down processes object recognition is slower, it is
possible that there was not enough time to fully identify the object. Specifically, the low-level
visual areas were only able to capture the overall shape of the objects, and without the aid of topdown processes this information was not enough to correctly identify the actual object.
The present findings are more in agreement with the possibility that top-down processes
influence object recognition in terms of attention. However, these findings are not able to rule
out the possibility that the PFC influences object recognition also in terms of perception. Given
that the n-back task was used to disrupt top-down processes, it was not possible to only disrupt
the PFC. Thus, the results from Experiment 2, 3, and 4 can be accounted by a disruption of brain
areas associated with attentional processes (e.g., PFC, PC, and premotor cortex), and by
disrupting the area associated with top-down perceptual processes (i.e., PFC). Further research in
which only the PFC is disrupted would permit to test whether the PFC carries perceptual
information or whether its role is just in terms of attention.
6.3 The Role of Perception and Attention in Working Memory
As mentioned before, Experiment 1 confirmed the central role of attention in working
memory. Experiment 2, 3, and 4 confirmed that attention affects object identification. Thus, it
becomes relevant to explain a possible relation between attention, perception, and working
memory. There are two main questions about working memory. The first is where the
information is stored, and the second is how it is maintained. In a previous section it was
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presented evidence showing that attention is needed to prevent loss of information from working
memory. In terms of where this information is stored, there is evidence suggesting that such
information is stored within higher-level perceptual areas (Jonides, Lacey, & Nee, 2005). That is,
information about object characteristics is stored within the temporal areas and information about
the location of the object is stored in parietal areas. For example, cells in temporal cortex are
active after the first picture but before the second picture is presented in a delayed match-tosample task (Miller, & Desimone, 1994). Also, human patients with damage in parietal cortex
show deficits in spatial working memory (e.g., Hanley, Young, & Pearson, 1991). This evidence
led Jonides et al. (2005) to suggest that working memory is stored within the perceptual systems
and attention is necessary to maintain it. Thus, it is likely that the strong influence of attention in
perceptual areas is not just to improve perceptual abilities but it is also to help maintain working
memory information.
6.4 Top-Down Processing Involvement in Short-Term and Long-Term Priming
Concurrent performance of an object-recognition and an n-back task showed a reduction
in short-term priming effects. Neuroimaging studies had shown that activity in ventral occipital
areas is greatly reduced the second time nonsense objects (i.e., do not have a mental
representation) were presented relative to new nonsense objects (van Turennout, Ellmore, &
Martin, 2000). This finding, in relation to the findings of Experiment 3 suggests that the n-back
task somehow affected occipital areas and as a consequence reduced priming effects. Based on
this, it is likely that top-down processes participate in short-term priming. Experiment 4
suggested that top-down processes also have an effect in long-term memory formation. However,
given the n-back and the control condition did not show significant priming effects more
experiments need to be performed to confirm this finding.

51

It is unlikely that covert naming of the pictures produced the short-term priming effects.
One reason to affirm this is that both secondary tasks required speaking numbers aloud. This
produced a bottleneck effect preventing participants from covertly naming the pictures during the
first phase of the experiment (see Ferreira & Pashler, 2002). Another reason is that there were no
significant long-term priming effects in Experiment 4. Previous evidence has shown that naming
pictures (even covertly) produces large long-term priming effects (Brown, Neblett, Jones, &
Mitchell, 1991; Francis et al., 2008). Thus, the fact that there was no priming in Experiment 4
indicates that participants were not covertly naming the pictures in the encoding phase. It is
therefore inferred that participants from Experiment 3 did not covertly name the prime pictures.
6.5 Future Directions
There are at least two possible lines of research to further the findings of the present
study. In Experiment 1 it was suggested that changes that occurred in the marginal areas of the
photos were more difficult to detect than changes that occurred in the areas of central interest.
However, it is not clear from Rensink’s study (1997) what is the exact difference between
marginal and central interest in a complex picture (e.g., Figure 1). His method of classifying
pictures into the two categories was to have participants view the two alternate versions of each
picture and indicate whether the change was in a central or marginal region. This method may
not be adequate as a preliminary analysis of the photos used for Experiment 1 showed low
agreement in terms of which photos showed a change in areas of central or marginal interest. It is
possible that many different characteristics within complex images can be considered to be of
central interest (e.g., a person, its aesthetic composition, etc.). A possible solution to this
problem is to perform an experiment similar to Experiment 1 but using eye-tracking
methodology. The eye-tracking apparatus would allow measurement of which areas are fixated
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first and for how long. It would allow for central and marginal interest areas to be defined
operationally in terms of the time it takes for a participant’s gaze to fixate on the region of the
scene in which the change occurs. This is a more objective approach and puts centrality or
marginality on a continuum rather than treating them as a dichotomy. In turn, this will permit
testing whether the n-back task has a different effect on pictures with changes on central and
marginal interest or those that are fixated earlier or later in viewing the scene.
As mentioned previously, with the n-back task it was not possible to disrupt only the PFC
to test its direct effect in object recognition and in repetition priming. A more selective and more
complete disruption of PFC can be accomplished using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),
in which a magnetic field pulse is passed through the area to be disrupted. It is used to simulate
the effects of a focal brain lesion but the function is disrupted for only a few seconds at a time.
Using TMS instead of the n-back task to disrupt specific areas such as PFC and PC will permit
testing the specific functions of each of these two areas in object recognition. For example,
object recognition can be tested while disrupting the ventrolateral areas of PFC, and be compared
to a control in which a specific area of the brain not involved in object recognition is disrupted.
This experiment could test the specific function of ventrolateral PFC in object recognition, and
help to differentiate between attentional and perceptual top-down influences.
6.6 Conclusion
The present study showed the importance of top-down processes in attention, object
recognition and short-term priming. Change detection and object recognition performance
decreased when top-down processes were disrupted showing that there is a close relation
between visual perception, attention, and working memory. Attention plays an important role in
facilitating visual perception and in maintaining visual information in working-memory. It was
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also shown that top-down processes influence short-term priming. However, future research it is
still needed to fully understand the specific role of top-down processes in short-term priming.
Long-term priming effects were also affected by disrupting top-down processes, although the
results were inconclusive. The pattern of results across the 4 experiments indicates that in order
to fully understand central cognitive processes such as attention, object recognition, working
memory, short-term, and long-term priming, top-down processes cannot be ignored. The present
study supports theoretical approaches to visual processing that include a role for feedback from
higher-level brain areas.
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Table 1
Object Recognition Performance in Experiment 2 as a Function of Concurrent Task and
Presentation Time (Standard Deviations).

Error Rates (%)
Presentation Time
50 ms

100 ms

500 ms

Response Times (ms)

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

60.4

47.9

460

478

(4.1)

(3.9)

(205)

(221)

25.4

16.5

457

430

(3.5)

(2.8)

(156)

(187)

10.4

3.4

505

468

(1.8)

(1.3)

(166)

(193)
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Table 2
Object Recognition Performance in Experiment 3 as a Function of Concurrent Task and
Presentation Time (Standard Deviations)

Error Rate (%)

Response Time (ms)

Presentation Time

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

100 ms

18.1

14.0

778

688

(2.0)

(1.9)

(306)

(325)

8.9

5.5

818

730

(1.3)

(0.8)

(337)

(328)

500 ms
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Table 3
Response Times for Picture Naming in Experiment 3 as a Function of Concurrent Task, Match
Between Prime and Target, and Prime Presentation Time (Standard Deviations)

Prime

Same Picture RT (ms)

Presentation

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

100 ms

1091

871

1175

1122

84

251

(251)

(241)

(285)

(264)

(175)

(182)

1065

882

1139

1125

74

244

(311)

(243)

(252)

(248)

(172)

(151)

500 ms

Different Picture RT (ms)

Priming (ms)

Note: Priming scores were obtained by subtracting the mean of the same picture condition from
the mean of the different picture condition.
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Table 4
Object Recognition Performance in Experiment 4 as a Function of Concurrent Task and
Presentation Time (Standard Deviations)

Error Rate (%)

Response Time (ms)

Presentation Time

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

50 ms

50.2

43.0

955

890

(3.9)

(3.6)

(277)

(277)

23.8

13.9

935

865

(3.5)

(2.3)

(293)

(281)

5.0

2.0

968

876

(1.3)

(0.8)

(334)

(339)

100 ms

500 ms
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Table 5
Picture Naming Response Times and Priming in Experiment 4 as a Function of
Concurrent Task and Prime Presentation Time (Standard Deviations)

Presentation Time
For Prime
50 ms

100 ms

500 ms

Response Times (ms)

Priming Scores (ms)

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

1101

1056

-23

22

(266)

(196)

(191)

(123)

1105

1067

-27

11

(239)

(212)

(135)

(127)

1058

1056

20

21

(186)

(203)

(109)

(119)

Note: Mean RT for new items was 1078 (SD = 179); priming scores were obtained by
subtracting the mean for each repeated condition from this value.
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Table 6
Object Recognition Performance in the Combined Analysis (N =160) as a Function of
Concurrent Task and Presentation Time (Standard Deviations)

Error Rate (%)

Response Time (ms)

Presentation Time

N-Back

Control

N-Back

Control

100 ms

19.2

12.1

743

680

(16.5)

(11.6)

(330)

(325)

6.1

2.4

783

709

(7.1)

(4.3)

(351)

(342)

500 ms
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Figure 1. Example of a picture pair used in Experiment 1. The shadow in the lower right corner
is what changes between these two pictures.
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Figure 2. Trial Structure for Experiment 1. A and A’ refer to alternate versions of the same
picture.
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Figure 3. Trial Structure for Experiment 2. The target appeared for 50, 100, or 500 ms.
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Figure 4. Trial Structure for Experiment 3. The first picture was presented for either 100 or 500
ms and was either the same or different from the final picture.
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Figure 5. Trial Structure for Experiment 4 at Encoding. The target appeared for 50, 100, or 500
ms. Pictures were not named at encoding.
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APPENDIX
Analyses of Arcsine Transformed Error Rates
Experiment 1 Error Rates
An analysis was performed for errors in which participants pressed the button but they
were not able to correctly report the change, showing that there was no difference between the nback and the number repetition conditions, t(39) = 1.56, p = .126. The item analysis also showed
no difference between the n-back and the number repetition conditions, t(39) = 1.21, p = .228.
A dependent samples t-test was performed to compare time-out error rates in the n-back
versus the number repetition conditions. The n-back condition showed significantly more timeout errors than the number repetition condition, t(39) = 4.8, p < .001. The item analysis also
showed significantly more time-outs for the n-back than the number repetition conditions, t(39) =
5.25, p < .001.
Experiment 2 Error Rates
A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on picture
identification error rates. First, there was a significant main effect of presentation time, F(2,
94) = 230.528, MSE = .031, p < .001, showing that error rates decreased with longer presentation
time. Planned comparisons showed that there were more errors for the 50 ms condition than for
the 100 and 500 ms conditions, [F(1, 47) = 225.361, MSE = 0.62, p < .001; F(1, 47) = 307.470,
MSE = .087, p < .001]. Also there were more errors for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms
condition, F(1, 47) = 55.676, MSE = .036, p < .001. Participants showed significantly more
errors in picture identification when they performed the n-back task than when they performed
the number repetition task, F(1, 47) = 37.364, MSE = .023, p < .001. This was true for the 50,
100, and 500 ms conditions, [t(47) = 4.860, p < .001; t(47) = 3.599, p = .001; t(47) = 5.443,
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p < .001]. In contrast to the analysis of untransformed error rates, there was a significant
interaction between secondary task and presentation time, F(2, 94) = 4.586, MSE = 0.12, p =
.013. Specifically, the effect of secondary task was bigger for the 50 ms than for the 100 ms and
the 500 ms conditions, [F(1, 47) = 4.379, MSE = .027, p = .042; F(1, 47) = 7.298, MSE = .029, p
= .010]. However, the effect of secondary task did not differ for the 100 ms and 500 ms
conditions, F(1, 47) = .692, MSE = .018, p = .410.
Error Rates for Experiment 3
A 2 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task at encoding) ANOVA was performed on
picture identification error rates. There was a main effect of presentation time, F(1, 47) = 37.128,
MSE = .012, p < .001, with more errors when pictures were presented for 100 ms than when they
were presented for 500 ms. This was true for the n-back task and for the number-repetition task,
[t(47) = 5.184, p < .001; t(47) = 5.332, p < .001]. There was also a main effect of secondary task
at encoding, F(1, 47) = 11.016, MSE = .007, p = .002, with more identification errors when
participants performed the n-back task than when they performed the number repetition task.
This effect was significant for both the 100 ms and 500 ms conditions, [t(47) = 2.674, p = .010;
t(47) = 2.611, p = .012]. The interaction between presentation time and secondary task was not
significant, F(1, 47) = .168, MSE = .004, p = .683.
Experiment 4 Error Rates
A 3 (presentation time) X 2 (secondary task) ANOVA was performed on picture
identification error rates. There was a main effect of presentation time, F(2, 126) = 327.064,
MSE = .022, p < .001. Planned comparisons showed more errors for the 50 ms condition than for
the 100 or 500 ms conditions [F(1, 63) = 274.756, MSE = .043, p < .001; F(1, 63) = 424.422,
MSE = .065, p < .001] . Also there were more errors for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms
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condition, F(1, 63) = 144.403, MSE = .022, p < .001. There was a main effect of secondary task,
F(1, 63) = 23.393, MSE = .022, p < .001, with significantly more errors for the n-back condition
than for the control condition. This difference was significant for the 50, 100, and 500 ms
conditions, [t(63) = 2.858, p = .006; t(63) = 4.548, p < .001; t(63) = 3.636, p = .001]. The
interaction was significant, F(2, 126) = 3.702, MSE = .013, p = .027. The effect of secondary
task was bigger for the 100 ms condition than for the 500 ms condition, F(1, 63) = 12.415,
MSE = .014, p < .001. However, the effect of secondary task did not differ for the 50 ms and 100
ms (F(1, 63) = .311, MSE = .032, p = .579) or for the 50 ms and 500 ms conditions (F(1,
63) = 3.218, MSE = .032, p = .078).
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